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Chapter 7  
Gary Browning  
Murdoch and the End of Ideology 
Introduction  
Is Murdoch apolitical? Murdoch’s thought tends to be reviewed without reference to 
her conception of politics. Her novels are read as exploring a range of personal 
emotions rather than public issues. Dooley maintains, ‘She (Murdoch) was fairly 
constant in her belief that the novel was not the place for expression of political or 
political comment…’ (Dooley, 2003, p. xix). Commentaries on her life limit 
themselves to passing reference to her early commitment to communism, but 
otherwise ignore her politics. Standard readings of her life either focus upon its abject 
end or concentrate on her personal relationships. It is true that Murdoch did not see 
herself as a political novelist (See Browning, 2013), and Murdoch’s life and work 
show her to be highly attuned to issues of personal morality and personal 
relationships. She takes friendship and love seriously. Yet she is a holistic thinker, 
whose metaphysics is inclusive in incorporating religion and sensuality, the search 
for goodness and the reality of evil and political as well as personal morality (See 
Browning, 2018). In fact, Murdoch’s novels engage with multiple aspects of 
experience, including reading of the political contexts and responsibilities of their 
characters. Indeed her philosophy and her novels reflect the particular political 
atmosphere of life in the West after the Second World War.   
Murdoch’s politics reflect her changing estimation of the character and role of 
ideology in Western politics in the second half of the twentieth century. In the early 
twentieth century, the grand ideologies of communism and fascism imposed 
themselves on European and world politics. In particular, their utopian visions 
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dominated political debate in the lead up to the Second World War and the fate of 
Europe and the world was entwined with the fate of nations that espoused their 
causes. In the aftermath of the Second World War, there was decline in ideological 
politics that was captured by Bell’s sociological observation of its demise (Bell, 1962). 
Yet its obituary coincided with signs of its revival. The New Left of the 1960s and the 
subsequent rise of the New Right put paid to the idea of the death of ideology. Yet 
the triumph of the West in the Cold War and the apparent eclipse of communism and 
fascism inspired Fukuyama to declare the end of history, and with it, the end of 
ideology (Fukuyama, 1989). Fukuyama took capitalism and liberal democracy to 
constitute the effective answers to historical questions of political and social 
organisation (Fukuyama, 1992) A few years earlier Leotard had heralded the arrival 
of postmodernism and the end of grand narratives, which implied a farewell to grand 
ideological claims (See Lyotard 1984 and Browning 2000).  In the aftermath of the 
Second World War Murdoch, like Bell and other political sociologists and political 
scientists, recognised how the intensity of ideological commitment had declined but 
she herself continued to espouse ideological causes.  Subsequently, she shared with 
Fukuyama a sense that communism was damaged fatally by its failures in Eastern 
Europe and the Far East, and while she never declared herself a postmodernist, her 
thinking reflects Lyotard’s diagnosis of the problems besetting grand narratives. What 
distinguishes her from Lyotard, Fukuyama and Bell in the immediate post-war 
context is that she neither declares the end of ideology, nor favours an unideological 
world. The framing and contesting of ideas by which we are to order our lives is 
central to Murdoch’s reading of the world, and more specifically of the political world. 
Even if she is critical of an ideological pursuit of political perfection that jeopardises 
the safety of individuals, she values political debate at the broadest level.   
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Liberal culture and Morality after the Second World War  
Murdoch was far from being apolitical during the Second World War. She embraced 
communism and passed secrets on to the Russians, and she was determined to help 
to make the world anew in its aftermath. This existential commitment embraced 
making the most of personal relationships that had been threatened by war but also 
required political action to restructure society (Murdoch, 1942). By the end of the war 
Murdoch was no longer a member of the Communist Party, but she remained a 
committed socialist. She was enthused by the Beveridge Report and delighted at the 
Labour Victory in 1945.  In the post-war world of the 1950s Murdoch took note of the 
post-war evolution of political theory and practice.  The ‘ends’ of the grand ideological 
schemes of communism and fascism had receded before the buoyant consumerism 
of Western capitalism. In the UK the burgeoning supply of consumer goods, and the 
development of a bureaucratic welfare state catering for basic needs combined to 
dilute working class radicalism. The materialist and scientific temper of the times also 
militated against speculative forms of knowledge and cast doubt on the claims of 
radical ideologies.  The hegemony of liberalism in the post-war world contrasted with 
the conflicted ideological scene of the inter-war years. Murdoch reflected upon these 
developments. She highlighted the shallowness of the contemporary post-war 
culture, observing the narrowness of its artistic expression and the restrictions of the 
prevailing forms of liberal morality. The contemporary novel and dominant moral 
ideas extolled individual choice at the expense of a broader vision of things and a 
recognition of the relationality of the social world. In the 1950s Murdoch continued to 
espouse the cause of socialism, though she took account of the contemporary 




In the 1950s, in a series of writings on art and existentialism Murdoch diagnosed the 
condition of her age, critiquing its narrow focus upon an individual’s will and its anti-
metaphysical temper. For Murdoch, cultural and moral possibilities were reduced to 
choosing, while the quality of thought and the character of choices were neglected... 
Murdoch identifies the limits and substitutes an unexplored individualism for positive 
social and political engagement. In a set of articles and talks she questions the 
existentialism to which she had been attracted at the end of the war. She criticises 
existentialism for imagining the individual as existing outside of historical and social 
determinants. In ‘The Existentialist Political Myth’ she concludes, ‘What answers 
does existentialism offer? It offers no answer. Its concept of value is problematic, a 
question mark. But it is an expression of a passionate and sincere desire to keep to 
the middle way, to preserve the values of an innocent and vital individualism in a 
world which seems to menace them from both sides. We may well feel sympathy 
with this passion, and with the cry of distress which accompanies it. It is not yet clear 
what will show whether or not the myth represents a tragic delusion.’ (Murdoch, 1997 
e, pp. 144-5)  In ‘Existentialist Bite’, a review of Everett Knight’s Literature 
Considered as Philosophy she sees existentialism as perhaps contributing to a 
refurbished Marxism to which she is sympathetic. Yet she adds, ’But its appeal as a 
philosophy is at present through its most non-Marxist aspects – its dramatic 
solipsistic, romantic and anti-social exaltation of the individual.’ (Murdoch, 1997c, p. 
153) In her celebrated Sartre- Romantic Rationalist (1953) Murdoch relates Sartre to 
the contemporary philosophical and political world. At its outset she recognises how 
Sartre’s phenomenological approach shares with contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophy an anti-essentialism and a scepticism over metaphysics. (Murdoch, 1953, 
pp. 1-11)  Sartre also resembles Anglo-American philosophy in privileging the 
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individual over social connections and a wider vision of things. She critiques Sartre 
because of his focus upon the isolated individual. She observes, ‘Sartre fails to 
emphasise the power of our inherited collective view of the world – save where it 
appears in the form of social prejudice and is labelled “bad faith.” (1953, p. 100)   
Again in ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited’, notwithstanding their distinctive 
styles, she identifies commonalities between Continental and Anglo-American 
philosophy in the contemporary cultural context.  She contrasts what she labels 
existentialism and empiricism, noting, ‘Existentialism and empiricism (as I shall call it 
for short) share a number of motives and doctrines. Both philosophies are against 
traditional metaphysics, attack substantial doctrines of the mind, have a touch of 
puritanism, construe virtue in terms of will rather than in terms of knowledge, 
emphasise choice, are markedly Liberal in their political bias, are neo-Kantian.’ 
(Murdoch, 1997f, p. 167) Murdoch does not see prevailing philosophical doctrines as 
commenting extensively on the social and political scene but she takes them to 
reflect its character. They respect science and hard-headed realism, disavow 
metaphysical speculation and supernatural religious doctrines and privilege the bare 
individual. Murdoch accepts the modern post-Kantian turn that takes thought to be 
limited by experience and rejects supra-natural dogma, but she is opposed to the 
constriction of moral, political and philosophical thought and art’s rejection of its 
mission to represent the world and its truth. In this piece she imagines how the novel 
might express a remodelled Kantian sublime in portraying real and intersecting 
individual characters that attest to a reality beyond the tight control of the novelist.  
Murdoch’s concerns over the nature of post-war society and culture come to the fore 
in her moral thought, which she develops in articles in the 1950s and then in her 
celebrated essays of the 1960s that are collected in The Sovereignty of Good (1970) 
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Murdoch’s critique of post-war culture and society is developed in her moral 
philosophy, which is set out in articles of the late 1950s and in the celebrated essays 
that are collected in The Sovereignty of Good (1970). Murdoch’s moral theory is 
multi-dimensional in that it is highly critical of aspects of contemporary moral theory 
and practice, while recognising the impossibility of returning to a pre-modern era. 
She notes how the modern post-war world abandons transcendent principles that are 
disconnected to experience and how its secularism turns against religious sanctions 
for moral conduct. While Murdoch accepts modern scepticism over the claims of 
religion and speculative ideals, she is also suspicious of the move to see morality as 
a mere device to co-ordinate preferences. In ‘Metaphysics and Ethics’ (1996) she 
critiques the theory and practice of contemporary morality. Her critique shows how 
current moral theory and practice rehearses uncritically prevailing liberal 
assumptions. Individual choice supplants traditional notions of God or transcendent 
principles.  In a word the post-war world of morality assumes the individualism that 
marks post-war political liberalism. Murdoch observes, ‘Is morality to be seen as 
essentially centred on the individual?... if we can come out of the trees and see the 
wood for a moment, it is clear that this is only one type of view of morality- roughly a 
Protestant, and less roughly a Liberal type of view.’ (1996, p. 245) In contrast to the 
prevailing orthodoxies, and in line with the related criticism of MacIntyre, Murdoch 
recognises how modern theories of morality accommodate changes in society. 
(MacIntyre, 1966) Murdoch contrasts contemporary liberal morality with those that 
derive from preceding historic theories. She highlights how modern liberal morality 
departs from a natural law model that presumes absolutist moral principles rather 
than founding moral conduct in the contingent choices of individuals. In questioning 
liberal assumptions she notes, ‘What I have called Natural Law moralists- Thomists, 
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Hegelians, Marxists- and less reflective persons who are camp followers of these 
doctrines, see the matter in a quite different perspective. (Murdoch, 1996 p. 247) In 
‘Metaphysics and Ethics’ she recognises the conceptual impoverishment of 
prevailing schemes of morality, which trace morality to unreflected individual choices. 
For Murdoch, it is not enough to maintain the right of liberal individuals to make 
choices. What matters is how we picture ourselves and imagine our moral life. The 
pictures that we imagine are not to be dismissed as representing otherworldly 
metaphysical views but rather as ways in which we identify ourselves and our 
possibilities in a wider scheme of things. These possibilities are constricted if we 
presume ourselves to constitute the centre of things, whereas we can identify 
ourselves differently and see ourselves as constituted by loving social relations.  
Hence, while recognising the vulnerability of traditional metaphysically-based 
theories of morality to modern iconoclasm, she concludes that to reduce morality to 
contemporary empiricist and liberal assumptions impoverishes our moral life. She 
urges more flexibility in our moral perspective, and specifically she calls for a more 
imaginative conceptualisation of experience that licenses more elaborated pictures of 
the human condition. She observes, ‘Man is a creature who makes pictures of 
himself and then comes to resemble the pictures.’ (Murdoch, 1996, p. 252) 
In the 1960s Murdoch set out her own provocative moral perspective that critiqued 
the shallowness of a contemporary culture that reduces the self-image of an 
individual to what can be described in individualist and behaviourist terms.  In ‘The 
Idea of Perfection’ (1970b) she parodies the ordinary language representation of 
morality that assimilates it to an individual making purchases in a shop. If Anglo-
American moral philosophy is comfortable in its consumerism, Continental 
existentialism is recognised to present a more heroic version of individualism, where 
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an individual agonises over her possibilities. Yet these heroic and prosaic versions of 
morality converge in reducing it to the contingent choices of an individual. In ‘On 
“God” and “Good”’(1970a)  and ‘The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts’ 
(1970d) Murdoch develops a moral perspective that is at odds with contemporary 
liberal assumptions. Instead of concentrating upon an individual’s autonomy, she 
considers the vision of the world informing an individual’s choices. She offers a moral 
theory whereby individuals align themselves with a conception of the good that is not 
limited to an individual interests or choices. She invokes Plato’s theory of the Good 
as a metaphorical transcendent magnetic force orienting individuals to an 
appreciation of goodness that is external to themselves and their interests. This 
Platonic conception of the good, for Murdoch, is not a substantive metaphysical 
reality as Plato himself might have imagined it. Rather it represents an imagined 
standard inspiring individuals to foster a self-critical perspective on how they should 
orient themselves in the world. Murdoch imagines that individuals are to turn their 
attention away from themselves to a loving appreciation of others. The upshot is that 
a loving engagement with a truth that is distinct from selfish preoccupations 
supersedes a narrow concentration upon individual’s own perspective on things.  
If Murdoch is clearly critical of aspects of liberal individualism, her moral theory does 
not abrogate the modern liberal society in which she was situated. Murdoch accepted 
that preceding forms of morality, vesting moral authority either in God or in 
metaphysical entities, were no longer maintainable. Likewise she recognised how 
morality in modern times demanded that Individuals themselves are to decide upon 
moral questions. In ‘The Idea of Perfection ‘ she describes how a mother (M) might 
change her mind on how to regard a daughter-in-law (D), after  initially imagining that 
she was unsuitable for her beloved son. In appraising her own perspective critically 
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and lovingly she is taken as arriving at a different point of view. Her change of 
perspective might be seen as conforming to a perfectionist rather than a subjectivist 
moral scheme, but it is a perfectionism that is neither otherworldly nor in denial of an 
individual’s role in assessing moral issues. It is the mother herself who establishes a 
just way of treating her daughter-in-law by reflecting self-critically on her initial way of 
regarding her.  She remains an independent operator, but who does not assume her 
immediate perspective is a true one. .      
.’A House of Theory’   
In 1958 in ‘A House of Theory’ (1997b) Murdoch reflects expressly upon the 
ideological climate of politics in the aftermath of the Second World War. She 
discusses ideology in the wider context of the cultural conditions of the post-war 
world. The rationalist temper of modernity and its tendency to demythologise 
preceding cultural myths is highlighted. In religion supernatural elements are called 
into question and in philosophy metaphysical beliefs are ditched, and in politics large 
scale belief systems are called into question.  In ‘A House of Theory’ Murdoch 
maintains an attenuated commitment to socialism, but observes how full-blooded 
ideological commitment is waning. She remarks, ’There is a certain moral void in the 
life of the country.’ (Murdoch, 1997b, p. 172) She observes a dissipation of energy 
within the socialist movement, which is due to a coalescence of factors; post-war 
prosperity, the entrenchment of the welfare state and a bureaucratic ossification of 
political life. This decline in the vitality of the socialist movement is part of a wider 
disenchantment and it draws upon an enduring empirical cast of mind on the part of 
English people. The upshot is a contemporary void of faith and declining political and 
moral conviction. She observes, ‘This void is uneasily felt by society at large and is 
the more distressing since we are now for the first time in our history feeling the loss 
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of religion as a consolation and guide; until recently various substitutes (socialism 
itself, later Communism, pacifism (internationalism) were available; now there seems 
to be a shortage even of substitutes.’ (1997b, p. 180) 
Murdoch’s reading of ideology in post-war Britain harmonizes with a wider sense of 
the decline of ideology that was identified in Anglo-American sociology and political 
science.  In 1960 Bell in The End of Ideology (1962) observes how ideological 
fervour, notably commitment to fascism and communism, had declined. He pointed 
to a lack of faith in social engineering and utopianism allied to contemporary 
prosperity that is buttressed by the operation of welfare schemes, as eliminating the 
desire for and prospect of radical change. He concludes, ‘In the Western world, 
therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political 
issues…the ideological age has ended.’ (Bell, 1960 pp. 402-3) Likewise in Political 
Man- The Social Bases of Politics (1960) Lipset, the American political scientist, 
argued that the mix of conflict and consensus in Western societies is conducive to 
political stability and leads to the exclusion of radical ideologies from the political 
system. Murdoch anticipates these political sociologists in sensing a decline in 
ideological commitments. She sees this decline as of a piece with the rationalisation 
of religion, the retreat from metaphysics and the first order theorizing about morality. 
God is dead and perhaps socialism and other ideologies are dying. The increase in 
welfare provision and the alleviation of poverty deflects from socialism, due to its 
removal of a major source of unrest. The unappetizing bureaucratic delivery of 
welfare renders the prospect of collective socialist action less attractive. Red tape 
rather than inspirational solidarity assumes the emblem of socialism. It is hard to 
maintain fervour for the ideology of socialism when sheer want has been relieved 
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and the realities of queuing and bureaucratic delivery quell the romanticism of 
political action.  
Murdoch is perceptive in connecting the decline in ideology to the disavowal of 
metaphysics and the general subscription to more limited styles of analysis in 
philosophy. Certainly political philosophy in the immediate post-war period was 
restrained in its aspirations, reining back speculative tendencies in the shade of the 
critique of metaphysics that had been undertaken by logical positivism. Peter Laslett 
in his Introduction to Philosophy Politics and Society vol. 1 (1956) proclaimed the end 
of political philosophy. Berlin in his lecture, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ argued for a 
commonsensical account of negative liberty and diagnosed positive liberty, as it was 
set out by radical or adventurous political theorists such as Rousseau and Hegel, to 
be dangerous in limiting the ordinary freedom of an individual to choose this rather 
than that.    
MacIntyre in ‘The End of ideology and the End of the End of Ideology’ (1971) 
recognised how ‘the end of ideology’ thesis responded to changes in post-war 
Western theory and practice, but he also noticed how ideology had re-emerged on to 
the political agenda of Western societies in the 1960s. But more than that, he  
highlighted how  the notion of the end of ideology itself represented a kind of 
ideology. He observed, ‘The Lipset-Bell vision of the world is informed by a view of 
rationality which makes liberal, pragmatic man the paradigm of rationality’ (1971, p. 
9) In the context of a general decline in ideological thinking in the 1950s and of a 
prevailing reluctance on the part of philosophers to engage in first order political 
theorising, Murdoch herself in ‘A House of Theory’, recognises the limits within which 
ideological argument is to operate. Yet, like MacIntyre, she is not persuaded that 
ideology is dead. Unlike Bell and Lipset, she does not give up on ideology and does 
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not serve herself a completely self-denying ordinance. Murdoch  acknowledges the 
problematic character of establishing a metaphysical reading of politics in a scientific 
age, but she  proposes  projecting possible conceptual representations of utopian 
possibilities for socialism. She imagines these utopian projections as legitimate ways 
of continuing the ideological representation of socialist possibilities.  
Murdoch likens what she proposes to develop socialist ideology to Hegel’s procedure 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit where he imagines  a multiplicity of shapes of 
consciousness that throw collective light on what it means to be a consciousness and 
how consciousness can operate in the world and deliver on its own claims and 
become aware of its own conditionality. Socialism might be imagined ideologically by 
relating images of possible socialist experience to serve as guides as to how 
socialism might be undertaken. What she is seeking is to renew the ideological 
imagination while subscribing to the practical and scientific limits of the modern age. 
In pointed contrast to the ‘liberal’ ideology of the end of ideology theorists, she notes, 
‘It is dangerous to starve the imagination of the young. We require, in addition to our 
“science”, a social analysis which is both detailed and frank in its moral orientation. A 
more ambitious conceptual picture, though out anew in the light of modern critical 
philosophy and our improved knowledge of the world, of the moral centre and moral 
direction of socialism would enable those of us who are not experts to pick up the 
facts of our situation in a reflective, organised and argumentative way: would give us 
what Shelley called the power to imagine what we know’ (1997b, p. 181) To support 
this project, she  also considers drawing upon the practical experience of forms of 
guild socialism so as to frame possibilities for socialist experimentation.  
The Early Novels 
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Murdoch’s early career reflects her reading of her contemporary context. In her 
theoretical essays she is alert to the nature of the post-war world, in which the growth 
of material prosperity and scientific achievement had undermined confidence in 
preceding unifying myths.  At the same time her theoretical essays show her 
commitment to renewing the socialist project, and they critique subjectivist currents in 
moral theory and practice. (See Browning, 2018). Did Murdoch’s novels reflect her 
political interests? Murdoch denied expressly that she was a political novelist. 
(Murdoch, 2013)  Of course the views of authors are to be respected, but views have 
to be interpreted. Certainly Murdoch did not canvas a set of doctrines in her novels. 
What she disliked about contemporary crystalline novels, such as those by Sartre 
and Camus, was how they presented a set of views rather open up to a world of free 
and distinct characters, whose actions are not dictated by a set of authorial views 
(Murdoch,1997a). But Murdoch’s reluctance to impose her own views on her novels 
does not entail that her novels do not reflect her reading of the contemporary world.. 
The characters in her novels are realistic and hence display attitudes and confront 
issues that disclose the post-war Western world. In doing so they reflect the 
contemporary political scene and so while not rehearsing directly Murdoch’s own 
political views, her novels deal with themes that relate to the post-war world of 
politics.     
 
Murdoch’s first novel, Under the Net (2002) has an unreliable narrator, Jake 
Donoghue, whose unreliability is an index of the changing nature of society. At the 
outset of the novel he is looking for a place to stay, and his lack of roots serves as a 
metaphor for his lack of enduring commitments. Jake’s rejection of conventional 
attitudes reflects a contemporary loss of ordering frameworks. Morals can no longer 
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rely upon traditional means of support and the ordering myths of religion and politics 
no longer convince. The Bohemian Jake is drawn to the philosophical scepticism of 
his friend, Hugo Belfounder, whose scepticism embraces doubting the efficacy of 
language to describe things. In answering a question on whether or not one can  be 
accurate in stating one’s feelings, Hugo maintains, ‘”One can’t be…The only hope is 
to avoid saying it. As soon as I start to describe I’m done for.”’ (Murdoch, 2002, p.67) 
Hugo’s scepticism is an exaggerated expression of the sceptical rationalism of the 
modern world. The cultural mood is against the construction of elaborated moral and 
political theories and current individualism is reflected in Jake’s egoism, which leads 
him to misperceive other characters. His self-absorption shows what has to be 
countered if individuals are to take account of others. For Murdoch, morality is as 
much about seeing others and their situation as it is about the choices individuals 
make. Jake is left-wing and sympathises with socialism, but cannot adhere to Lefty 
Todd’s revolutionary socialism, because he understands the post-war world to be 
one without revolutionary credentials and possibilities. Jake’s reading of the 
prospects for socialism reflects Murdoch’s own sense that the welfare state and a 
spiritless consumerism have weakened the prospects for radical socialism. Yet 
Jake’s socialism is more than nostalgia for  a past ideal. It reflects his distaste for 
commercialism and the subordination of authenticity to materialism in current society.  
Under the Net delivers a fragile commitment to socialism alongside an image of 
London as a place in which conventions and traditions are receding and in which 
foundational beliefs are being questioned. Murdoch’s second novel, The Flight From 
the Enchanter (2000a) reveals a troubled deracinated society and an uncertain 
political environment that contains frustrated and vulnerable individuals. The novel’s 
plot focuses  upon migrants, whose uncertain status heightens its sense of the 
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rootlessness in contemporary society. The migrants are neither of a piece nor 
uniformly sympathetic. The Polish refugees, Jan & Stefan Lusiewicz are strange and 
threatening, Mischa Fox is a sinister, demonic figure and Nina, a vulnerable 
dressmaker, is one of the many women, whose lives are controlled by the media 
magnate, Mischa Fox. Nina’s vulnerability is intensified when, at the instigation of 
Mischa Fox, a question is asked in parliament on the status of refugees. Legally, 
rights for refugees depend upon their whether they were born to the west of an 
arbitrary point in Eastern Europe, though in practice the regulation of working 
migrants was lax. Nina’s insecurities, however, are aroused by the interest in the 
status of migrants that is aroused by the parliamentary question, and having been 
born on the wrong side of the arbitrary line she is unnerved by the situation. She is 
thrown into confusion and is terrified at the prospect of having to return to an 
inhospitable homeland. She is at the mercy of the state and the mysterious Mischa 
Fox. Desperate, and unsupported by friends, acquaintances and political regulations, 
Nina commits suicide.  
Nina’s death highlights the political difficulties of being a migrant and symbolises the 
moral and political failings of a society that cares insufficiently for the vulnerable and 
ignores the plight of migrants. Murdoch’s focus upon migrants in The Flight From the 
Enchanter reflects her concern for the vulnerable and her sense that rights to protect 
migrants should not rest upon arbitrary geopolitical judgments. At the end of the 
Second World War she herself  worked in Graz for UNRRA (United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration) and had witnessed at first hand the wretchedness 
of refugees from the war’s calamities.(See Murdoch, 1945 ) Like Under the Net, The 
Flight From the Enchanter shows Murdoch’s interest in the post-war political world 
and if the latter flags her continued commitment to socialism, the former shows her 
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commitment to the cause of  migrants and the need to secure enabling rights. 
Throughout her career as a novelist and as a political theorist, she recognises the 
plight of refuges and the need for a human rights regime.       
Murdoch’s identification of a current unease within contemporary politics and religion 
is evident in The Bell (2004).  In The Bell she imagines a lay religious community that 
is dedicated to communal and spiritual renewal. Its members have opted out of the 
outside world, and its commodification and declining faith, to undertake a shared and 
spiritual way of life. The community is established at Imber Court in Gloucestershire 
and is next to Imber Abbey, a convent of Benedictine nuns. The owner of Imber 
Court and the leader of the community is Michael Meade, a former teacher, who had 
to leave teaching when he became involved with a troubled adolescent boy, Nick 
Fawley. Work within the community is treated as a life enhancing and community 
oriented activity rather than a commercial transaction and the community is 
committed to spiritual worship and practice. In the aftermath of Nick Fawley’s visit to 
the community, however, it falls apart. Jealous on seeing Michael kissing  a young 
visitor to the community, Toby Gashe, Nick commits suicide. Michael Meade’s 
repressed homosexuality and his inability to deal with his sexual feelings and 
responsibilities contributes to the tragic events but they are handled sensitively by 
Murdoch. This sensitivity reflects her defence of the legalisation of homosexuality in 
her essay, ‘The Moral Decision About Homosexuality.’ (1964)  The Bell is a complex 
novel dealing with many inter-related themes. Socially and politically it testifies to a 
restlessness amidst contemporary society. It captures a dissatisfaction with 
traditional attitudes and practices and a sense of the lack of a clear direction 
forwards .The lay community at Imber Court intimates a political route away from a 
secular liberal society and the depiction of Michael Meade’s troubled sexuality points 
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to the need for a more inclusive attitude towards homosexuality, which was only to 
be legalised in 1967.  The uncertainties of the present and a political commitment to 
advance socialism is registered, without being developed in The Sandcastle (1960),  
where the protagonist, Bill Mor intends to stand as a Labour MP.    
Murdoch’s Later Political Thought 
Murdoch moved away from a commitment to radical change and socialism. Her 
letters reveal her sensitivity to the dangers of the political imposition of radical 
doctrines and she came to favour a limited style of politics, which offered security for 
the individual. Her late conception of politics is set out in Metaphysics as a Guide to 
Morals (1992a) in which she elaborates a comprehensive metaphysics. In the 
chapter ‘Morals and Politics’ she provides an integrated understanding of the 
relations between politics and personal morality. In this late account of politics she 
warns against the dangers that can be unleashed in the name of radical political 
ideology. Her direct experience of displaced persons at the end of the Second World 
War and her continuing contact with Europeans of Eastern and central Europe 
alerted her to the calamities of repressive states.  In the light of dangers of a utopian 
style of politics that disregarded the rights of ordinary individuals she became 
convinced of the value of public order and the rule of law in a liberal polity. Securing 
order allows for personal moral development, and for the later Murdoch the freedom 
of individuals to pursue the good as they see it takes precedence over the pursuit of 
an elusive  public perfection..   
‘Morals and Politics’ in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992b) is a subtle and 
intricate analysis of the public world that traces the inter-connections between 
morality and politics.  Murdoch recognises their reciprocity, for she appreciates how 
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experience is not divided between discrete areas of activity. Moral thinking may 
observe differing areas of operation but it does not halt at borders. Hence Murdoch 
argues that the public world is not exempt from moral considerations. She urges that 
politics is to be regulated by moral norms and that this mode of regulation is distinct 
from personal morality even if the manner in which regulatory public norms are 
canvassed and experienced is affected by personal morality.  Murdoch inclines 
towards accepting a distinction, suggested by experience, between a public political 
world that is regulated by highly general axioms prescribing a set of rights and rules, 
and a personal sphere in which individuals aspire to perfectionist moral goals. 
Personal moral life is likened to a spiritual journey, in which the self develops through 
its moral encounters with others, and assumes personal responsibilities given that 
the self possesses particular talents and maintains specific relations to others. Public 
life protects the basic requirements for a decent life. She observes that the distinction 
signalled by the phrase,’…political philosophy is about “advice to princes”, or 
politicians, or citizens, whereas moral philosophy is aimed at each particular thinker 
or agent’, deserves to be kept in mind. (Murdoch, 1992b, p. 351)   
 
Murdoch’s subscription to a distinction between private and public morality does not 
imply an absolute separation between two spheres and is not sanctioned by 
unassailable philosophical argument. Mill in On Liberty (2016) distinguishes between 
self-regarding and other regarding actions in stipulating that the law should only 
regulate the conduct of individuals insofar as they affect others adversely by inflicting 
harm. For Mill, the state has no business interfering in the self-regarding actions of 
individuals. However, it is notoriously difficult to designate actions that are purely 
self-regarding. Suicide and drug-taking, for instance, affects others in that friends and 
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family members are affected by these apparently self-regarding actions. 
Pornography might seem to be an indulgence that does not harm others but it can be 
said to distort the way in which women in general are regarded.  Murdoch is aware of 
the difficulties in establishing a watertight distinction between the private and the 
public. She does not invoke general principles of reason in drawing a distinction, but 
relies upon the comments of empirically-minded philosophers such as Hume and 
Hobbes, who point to the dangers in social life that experience suggests require 
intervention.  Murdoch is mindful of the tendency for plans to go wrong in the public 
realm and of the dangers of misguidedly pursuing Utopianism.1 Her recognition of 
the evident harm inflicted upon their populations by the recently deposed repressive 
regimes of Eastern Europe that purported to lead Utopian projects, reinforces her 
respect for the liberal protection of the individual. In highlighting the public duty to 
protect the individual she remarks, ‘Liberal political thought posits a certain 
fundamental distinction between the person as citizen and the person as moral-
spiritual individual.’(Murdoch, 1992b, p. 357) 
 
While distinguishing personal morality from the public sphere, Murdoch observes 
their connections. Without receiving protection in the public sphere. Individuals would 
be obstrcted in their pursuit of moral ideals. She also recognises the problematic 
nature of establishing and developing norms for the public world. The dangers that 
follow from lax or ill-conceived regulation of politics prioritise maintaining fundamental 
axioms that establish clear-cut rules to protect citizens (Murdoch, 1992, p. 352). 
Murdoch allows for the prospect of these rights going beyond the borders of the 
nation state, which reflects her lifelong appreciation of the international context of 
politics. 2She urges that the public sphere should be regulated by axioms securing 
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the basic requirements for a decent life, for example the human rights of life and 
liberty so as to check the conduct of governments as well as individuals. The 
experiential inspiration and variety of these rights entail that the axioms governing 
the public world do not constitute a system or derive from an overarching 
philosophical formula. Again, Murdoch’s sense of the contestability and  variation in 
the formulation of these axioms across time and space mean that they are not to be 
seen as deriving from  a supervening and universal natural law. Rather axioms 
evolve piecemeal as experience suggests the significance of protecting areas of life. 
For instance terrorist incidents might lead to increased measures of security in likely 
areas of terrorist attack. Changes in moral outlook such as a greater toleration of 
sexual diversity will lead to the extension of rights to homosexuals. Axioms change in 
line with changing perceptions of interests and moral commitments, so that deeply 
held personal moral convictions on say, ecology, that at one time seem eccentric, at 
a later date can be enshrined in public law.  
 
Notwithstanding the contestable nature of public axioms and their contingent 
formulation, their role in securing effective order in the public sphere is linked to their 
command of widespread support. Their efficacy depends upon obedience, and 
obedience is reinforced by their moral approval by citizens. The public and the 
personal are related by the formulation and effective operation of axioms. Personal 
moral commitments serve to inspire the development of axioms and to reinforce 
community solidarity and the maintenance of laws and rights. There is, however, a 
persisting tension between the public and the personal. While the axioms and laws 
governing the operation of the public sphere demand adherence by citizens, on 
occasions individuals will perceive their personal moral commitments to conflict with 
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public rules. In these circumstances civil disobedience can be justified. The case for 
civil disobedience is explored in her novel, An Accidental Man (2003), in which a 
young American Ludwig Leferrier contemplates remaining in England to avoid the 
draft to take part in the Vietnam War. Eventually Ludwig returns to the United States 
and faces the consequences of his preceding avoidance of the draft.   Moral 
commitments, for Murdoch, are not merely subjective preferences that can be put 
aside; they are significant orienting factors in an individual’s spiritual life. Murdoch 
endorses civil disobedience but she takes it to be exceptional and problematic, for 
disobedience may weaken the force of public order, which allows for and protects the 
development of  wide-ranging personal moral commitments. 
 
In distinguishing a public world in which the priority is to preserve order and basic 
rights from a private world where people strive for goodness, Murdoch looks to the 
realistic picture of politics that is put forward by Hobbes. Locke and Hume and the 
critical Marxism of Adorno rather than to the elaborate theoretical ideologies put 
forward by Marx and radical utopian theorists. Her late distrust of radical ideology is 
reflected in her critique of the Soviet Union and the suspicion of China that is 
expressed in her letters and in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Murdoch 1992, p.  
365).3 What she values in public morality and the practice of politics are axioms, 
fundamental security rights that protect individuals from the dangers of political 
violence and terror. If she no longer requires radical change in the political arena, 
what is offered in the political sphere continues to matter. In her novel, The Nice and 
the Good (2000) the principal protagonist,   John Ducane, a civil servant, investigates 
a mysterious death in Whitehall but in order to protect the husband of a friend, 
delivers a less than full report into the death. Ducane decides to put the obligations of 
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personal morality above those of the public domain, but he recognises the 
significance of the public sphere by resigning from his post.      
 
Murdoch’s turn towards a limited style of politics and the protection of basic freedoms 
in a liberal democracy might seem to unite her thought to that of Fukuyama. In  the 
light of the demise of the Soviet Union. Fukuyama rethought the world of ideology 
and set out a Hegelian argument for the triumph of liberal democracy.4 He 
maintained that history has shown how liberal democracy resolves the issue of 
recognition in a way that has no viable competition. Rival ideologies such as 
socialism and fascism have been shown to be repressive rather than to protect 
individuals. Their record of repression and violence speaks for itself. He urges that 
history points ‘…to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.’ 
(Fukuyama, 1989, p. 3) In The End of History and the Last Man the end of the cold 
war is seen as signalling the end of mankind’s ideological evolutionary development 
in resolving the issues of human recognition. (Fukuyama, 1992) The later Murdoch’s  
review of the ideological scene bears an affinity with Fukuyama in that she is deeply 
disturbed by the historical catastrophes of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany and opts 
for a cautious and liberal form of politics. Her thought is different from Fukuyama’s 
however in that she does not see political development as coming to an end. She is 
suspicious of ‘endism’ even if the projected end is what she supports. She differs 
from Fukuyama in not ruling out ideological developments. Just as MacIntyre  and 
Oakeshott, in differing idioms, see history as precluding a neat universal answer to 
morality and politics so Murdoch envisages history as continuing to develop and to 




Lyotard is another theorist of the late twentieth century to whom Murdoch bears a 
resemblance. Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge was first 
published in 1979 (Lyotard, 1984). Although its publication predates the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Lyotard may be said to have anticipated its collapse in rejecting the 
universal claims of its radical ideology. Lyotard is famous for announcing the end of 
grand narratives and in so doing to mark the end of modernity and the beginnings of 
postmodernity. Modernity is defined by its imagining that objective truth can be 
established. Examples of grand narratives include Hegelianism and Marxism in its 
various guises, as well as theories of large-scale liberalism such as those provided 
by Rawls and Keynes. (See Browning, 2002) For Lyotard old style certainties were 
crumbling just as the Berlin Wall was destined to fall. What follows, for Lyotard, is a 
postmodern recognition that history does not constitute a single pattern. Meaning is 
not susceptible to neat frames of reference. Lyotard’s, The Differend (1988) 
establishes how phrases operate in different incommensurable ways so that we 
cannot establish a single form of interpretation to link our several ways of considering 
things. Likewise in Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime (1994) he explains how a 
Kantian sense of the sublime can intimate a differend, which cannot be captured in 
general reasoning.  While Murdoch herself is opposed to forms of dogmatic 
rationalism, is suspicious of political utopianism  and is attracted to Kant’s use of the 
sublime, she does not call for the end of ideology. Unlike Lyotard, she imagines that 
there remains a role for metaphysical thinking. (See Murdoch1992a and 1993).  
Murdoch and Lyotard: The Book and the Brotherhood and Grand Narratives 
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 On the face of things Murdoch is unlike Lyotard. She is not a postmodernist. Indeed 
she critiques it in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992a), and she revives Plato 
precisely to express her commitment to an objectivist notion of the good rather than 
succumb to what she sees as an uncritical subjectivism. Yet there are affinities 
between Lyotard and Murdoch in that they both turned against forms of ideology that 
claim to represent the end of history and Murdoch, like Lyotard, held that there were 
processes of demythologisation at work in late modernity. An affinity between the two 
can be discerned in Murdoch’s late novel, The Book and the Brotherhood (1987), 
which is a complex novel that contains interweaving plots. Its central drama  
concerns a Gesellschaft, a society of Oxford graduates, led by Gerard Hernshaw, 
who decide to support financially the work of David Crimmond a radical and 
charismatic political theorist and activist. Crimmond is to write a great book or grand 
narrative that will deliver a definitive critique of present society. On its formation in 
the 1950s, all the members of the society are of a similar radical mind and see the 
projected grand narrative as a means to propel society forwards. With the passage of 
time, things change and the remaining members of the society no longer subscribe to 
a left-wing radicalism. By the 1980s and like Murdoch herself, they support 
parliamentary democracy and are suspicious of radical political theories. They have 
moved on from disruptive politics, and perceive a grand narrative to represent an 
anachronism. The members of the society bemoan their fate. They resent the 
payments to Crimmond and are out of sympathy with the project. Moreover, 
Crimmond behaves abominably in cuckolding one of the brotherhood, Duncan 
Cambus by bewitching his wife Jean.   
Gerard is despatched to meet with Crimmond to ascertain his progress on the project 
and to find out what kind of political line is being followed. Gerard’s fears are realised 
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in that Crimmond revels in his critique of the kind of liberalism that is maintained by 
Gerard and his fellow members of the brotherhood. Crimmond declares, ‘Of course I 
think this society, our so-called free society, is rotten to the core – its oppressive and 
corrupt and unjust, it’s materialistic and ruthless and immoral and soft, rotted with 
pornography and kitsch.’ (Murdoch, 1987, p.296). Crimmond is scornful of Gerard’s 
liberalism and proclaims, like other radical ideologists,  that he has grasped the 
sense of history. He maintains, ‘I just belong to now. I’m doing what has to be done 
now. I’m doing the history of our time, which you and your friends seem to be entirely 
unaware of’ (Murdoch, 1987 p.295). On the book’s publication, however, Gerard is 
shocked to realise his own reaction to it. He is excited and stimulated by it. 
Crimmond produces a radical but provocative tome and Gerard is grateful for the 
stimulation that it provides. Gerard declares to his long-time friend Rose Curtland, 
‘He (Crimmond) thinks liberal democracy is done for. He’s a sort of pessimist 
utopian. And of course we’re right, all right I’m right and he’s wrong- but my 
rightness- needs to be changed- shaken, uprooted, replanted, enlightened…’ 
(Murdoch, 1987, p. 560) What is suggested by The Book and the Brotherhood is that 
though the demonic Crimmond is misguided in his radical utopian critique of society, 
his grand narrative nevertheless serves the vital purpose of providing a critical frame 
for assessing society and the politics of liberalism. For Murdoch, it is wrong to 
sideline ideology, or worse to proclaim it to be dead. At the end of her career, as in 
its beginning, she sees a continuing role for ideology. There can be no terminus for 
politics or theory and ideological grand narratives contribute to our on-going 




Murdoch reflects upon politics, the nature of political theory and ideology throughout 
her life. Her own early radical political commitments combine with a recognition in her 
early writings that the great political myths, like the myths of religion and philosophy 
are receding before a modernist tide of rationalism and liberal capitalism. In the West 
the working class is deradicalised by a combination of consumerism and state 
welfare. Murdoch is a perceptive social commentator in recognising what is 
happening. Yet she does not abandon radicalism. Instead she urges that 
phenomenological images of socialist utopianism can frame a continuing appeal. Her 
early novels recognise changing times and a continued commitment to radical 
causes. She highlights the repressiveness of a political culture in which 
homosexuality is criminalised and all her novels after The Bell depict gay people 
empathetically. She is sympathetic to migrants, imagining them realistically in 
capturing their vulnerability. She is uncannily prescient in depicting their susceptibility 
to social and political pressures, which sadly has been a feature of more recent 
times. Under the Net depicts a society that is uncertain of its future direction even if a 
vague commitment to socialism is transmitted, Unlike many contemporary theorists 
of society Murdoch resists the idea that ideology is dead. Political questions are 
shown to be alive and ideology offers a way of orienting opinion in changing times. 
In her late work, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992) Murdoch revisits her 
conception of the political and perceives the priority of safeguarding the public 
sphere from manifest dangers. She is mindful of the ways in which radical utopian 
regimes have been repressive and adversely affected the lives of numberless 
ndividuals. Her priority is to ensure that rights are established to provide security for 
individuals and she turns against the radical socialism that she espoused in her 
youth. At the same time she recognises that thinking about the political cannot be 
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circumscribed and she welcomes ongoing reflection  upon the political sphere and 
the continuing development of rights. She imagines a future in which animal rights 
might receive more attention and the ecological considerations might play a more 
pronounced role in politics. Hence in The Book and the Brotherhood (1987) the 
grand narrative of Crimmond, which rehearses a radical utopian ideology, is 
presented sympathetically. It seems as if Murdoch recognises the power and value of 
ideas and she does not envisage the end of ideology or the grand narrative as do 
Fukuyama and Lyotard. Murdoch shows an ambiguous attitude towards the 
demythologisation of large-scale beliefs in the modern world. On the one hand she 
accepts that metaphysics can no longer be dogmatically pronounced just as 
supernatural religious beliefs can no longer be maintained and transcendent 
principles in morality  are no longer convincing. On the other hand she recognises 
that if our vision of the world is deprived of wider thinking on the nature of reality and 
the good life, our world will be reduced to a spiritless empiricism and conceptual 
insularity. What she favours is a continuing conceptual openness that allows for a 
larger vision of things without committing to supernatural or unverifiable propositions. 
In politics she is cautious of upholding a utopian ideology that might involve threaten 
individual safety, but she also favours the continued development of general visions 
of the political world that will allow for critical thinking and a critical engagement with 
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